Abstract

In 2021, Canada passed legislation to change its medical assistance in dying (MAID) program from one in which eligibility was restricted to individuals nearing end-of-life to one in which individuals with serious but non-fatal illnesses, diseases, or disabilities could be eligible. Proponents of this change often frame it as a victory for patient autonomy, arguing that it had been a paternalistic moral imposition for the state to restrict the so-called ‘right to die’ to individuals who were already near death. However, this expanded MAID program still relies on state-defined eligibility criteria as to what kind of suffering renders intentional death acceptable. The 2021 MAID eligibility expansion was, therefore, not a removal of moral values from MAID law but rather a change in which moral values are deemed most legitimate. My dissertation research aims to shed light on this significant socio-moral change by examining the relationship between moral and political values in the context of the legitimisation of MAID in Canada. This talk focuses in on a specific theme that emerged during fieldwork interviews: ambiguity. Both pro- and anti-MAID interviewees – all of whom were legal, medical, or political experts on assisted dying – would often raise concerns that the Canadian MAID legislation was too ambiguous. I argue that this legal ambiguity has the effect of diffusing moral responsibility for MAID eligibility decisions, and that this diffusion has the double-edged potential to reduce both moral injury and oversight efficacy.