Abstract

This talk presents the first comprehensive security evaluation of Internet voting systems used in U.S. federal elections. We find that all systems suffer from critical flaws that allow attackers to expose a voter’s private ballot, change votes, or otherwise control an election’s outcome. As a direct result of this work, many states altered or canceled plans to use these voting systems. We’ll discuss the security requirements of voting systems, new developments, and open problems in the domain.

Central to this research is an understanding of how the economic, regulatory, and technical attributes of actors can result in a misalignment of incentives, ultimately leading to security vulnerabilities in high-stakes systems crucial to democracy. Expanding on this theme, I will discuss my work on similar problem domains – including encryption and surveillance – that further demonstrate how an interdisciplinary approach is crucial for solving important, societally-relevant problems in cryptography and systems security.

Michael A. Specter is an assistant professor in Computer Security and Privacy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He leads a fantastic laboratory of students working at the intersection of security, privacy, and democracy.

He holds a PhD in EECS from MIT , advised by Gerald Jay Sussman and Danny Weitzner. His research focuses on systems security and applied cryptography, with an emphasis on problems that have an impact on public policy and society. His interdisciplinary work earned him a Pioneer Award from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a JD Falk Award from the M3AAWG , and a Google ASPIRE PhD fellowship. His research has been extensively covered in the popular press, including The New York Times, The New Yorker, CNN , Vice, Bloomberg, Fortune, and The Economist.

Zoom link: https://cam-ac-uk.zoom.us/j/84228083332?pwd=FZadY8C7D8hiMqDywf8Sv72yne58OS.1