University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Optimization and Incentives Seminar > Analytic Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction

  Browse A-Z

Log in

Googledetails Microsoftdetails

🔐 Log In

Information on

Subscribing to talksdetails Finding a talkdetails Adding a talkdetails Disseminating talksdetails Help and Documentationdetails

ℹī¸ Information

Analytic Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction

Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Felix Fischer .

Abstract: Frank Kelly and the speaker proposed a decentralized combinatorial auction called PAUSE that allows for all possible combinatorial bids, and yet is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and transparent to the bidders. We examine this auction from an analytic viewpoint. Specifically, we derive a number of results related to the revenue generated, including showing that PAUSE generates at least as much revenue as the VCG mechanism when there are only two bidders, and providing lower bounds on the revenue under various scenarios with an arbitrary number of bidders. We also propose a modification of the auction that has the potential to increase revenue while retaining the auction’s most desirable features. (Joint work with S. Damla Ahipasaoglu and James B. Orlin).

This talk is part of the Optimization and Incentives Seminar series.

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

Other lists

Trinity College Machine Learning Summary henry moore

Other talks

Group Work Title to be confirmed Morning Tea and Coffee Morning Break / Group Photo Novel neuroimaging methods in Lewy body dementia Evolution: Inevitable or Remarkable?
 

Š 2006-2025 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity