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Margining with Multiple Central Counterparties

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Mustapha Amrani .

Systemic Risk: Mathematical Modelling and Interdisciplinary Approaches

Co-authors: Paul Glasserman (Columbia University), Kai Yuan (Columbia University)

Spurred by regulatory efforts to mitigate systemic risk, many financial markets are shifting from a bilateral model of settlement towards central clearing. This is facilitated by a number of central counterparties (CCPs) that have recently emerged. We consider the issues that arise from the presence of multiple CCPs clearing a common set of financial products. In particular, we highlight a number of downstream consequences when such CCPs differ with respect to their margining policies.

This talk is part of the Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series series.

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