Abstract

How does our brain construct meaningful representations of the world around us? Do these representations differ in speakers of one and two languages? Does language affect the perception and categorisation of things around us? Is there such thing as unconscious meaning processing? On the basis of examples from bilingual comprehension and production, linguistic relativity, and executive functioning, I will propose that our conception of meaning formation and decision-making may need drastic revision. A fully interactive, non-selective account of the human brain is largely inconsistent with modular views positing some functions (such as language) as encapsulated and relatively independent vis-à-vis other specialised brain systems such as face recognition or motor control. Taken together, clues I have accumulated over fifteen years of research suggest unsuspected levels of processing automaticity and rather puzzling limitations to conscious evaluation in humans. We only have conscious awareness to understand the nature of the mind, yet most of what defines us appears to stem from spontaneous, unconscious information processing that is wholly impenetrable. In closing, I make a tentative connection between such empirical results and the philosophical concept of freedom.