University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Finance & Accounting Seminar Series > β€œCan Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Governance Through Collective Action?”

β€œCan Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Governance Through Collective Action?”

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Can institutional investors generate sufficient power through collective action to drive improvements in governance? We use proprietary data on the private communications of a formal coalition of Canadian institutional investors and find that its private engagements influenced firms’ adoption of majority voting and say-on-pay advisory votes, improved compensation structure and disclosure, and influenced CEO incentive intensity. Spillovers to non-engaged firms occur through board interlocks and to firms in which the CCGG is expected to be more powerful in a voting contest. This form of activism is both a substitute and complement to other interventions to address governance concerns.

This talk is part of the Finance & Accounting Seminar Series series.

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