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Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading and University of Texas at Austin)
Thursday 25 October 2007, 16:30-18:00
Practical reasoning and inference
- đ¤ Speaker: Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading and University of Texas at Austin)
- đ Date & Time: Thursday 25 October 2007, 16:30 - 18:00
- đ Venue: Seminar Room 2, History and Philosophy of Science, Department of
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Lauren Kassell
Abstract
One way of capturing the force of practical reasoning, or deliberation, is to think of it as inference (e.g. the practical syllogism). I reject this inferential model, and offer another, under which the force of reasoning is of a rather different sort. The conclusion of a process of deliberation can, on this new model, be an action, and such deliberation can have a structure, but it is not inferential structure.
Series This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.
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