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SUMMARY:Auction Design via Optimal Transportation - Constantinos Daskalaki
 s (MIT)
DTSTART:20180326T153000Z
DTEND:20180326T163000Z
UID:TALK103283@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Prof. Clément Mouhot
DESCRIPTION: I will present an optimization framework based on optimal tra
 nsport theory\, characterizing the structure of revenue-optimal auctions i
 n single-bidder multi-item settings. Our framework provides closed-form de
 scriptions of multi-item auctions\, generalizing Myerson's celebrated sing
 le-item result\, and exhibits simple settings with very rich structure in 
 their optimal auction. Our result is obtained by establishing strong duali
 ty between optimal auctions and optimal transportation\, enabled by an ext
 ension of the Monge-Kantorovich duality that accommodates convexity constr
 aints in the dual of the optimal transportation problem. The talk is based
  on work with Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos\, appearing here https:/
 /onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA12618.\n
LOCATION:CMS\, MR13
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