BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks - Jean-Edouard Col
 liard (HEC Paris)
DTSTART:20190124T130000Z
DTEND:20190124T140000Z
UID:TALK110266@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:CERF/CF Admin
DESCRIPTION:How do resolution frameworks affect the private restructuring 
 of distressed banks? We model a distressed bank’s shareholders and credi
 tors negotiating a restructuring given asymmetric information about asset 
 quality and externalities onto the government. This yields negotiation del
 ays used to signal asset quality. We find that strict bail-in rules increa
 se delays by worsening informational frictions and reducing bargaining sur
 plus. We characterize optimal bail-in rules for the government. We then co
 nsider the government’s possible involvement in negotiations. We find th
 is can lead to shorter or longer delays. Notably\, the government may gin 
 from committing not to partake in negotiations.
LOCATION:Room W4.05 Cambridge Judge Business School
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR