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SUMMARY:A Sybil-proof one-hop DHT - Chris Lesniewski-Laas\, MIT
DTSTART:20080327T160000Z
DTEND:20080327T163000Z
UID:TALK11333@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Andrew  Lewis
DESCRIPTION:Decentralized systems\, such as structured overlays\, are subj
 ect to the Sybil attack\, in which an adversary creates many false identit
 ies to increase its influence. This paper describes a one-hop distributed 
 hash table which uses the social links between users to strongly resist th
 e Sybil attack. The social network is assumed to be fast mixing\, meaning 
 that a random walk in the honest part of the network quickly approaches th
 e uniform distribution. As in the related SybilLimit system\, with a socia
 l network of n honest nodes and m honest edges\, the protocol can tolerate
  up to o(n/log n) attack edges (social links from honest nodes to compromi
 sed nodes). The routing tables contain O(√m log m) entries per node and 
 are constructed efficiently by a distributed protocol. This is the first s
 ublinear solution to this problem. Preliminary simulation results are pres
 ented to demonstrate the approach's effectiveness.
LOCATION:Computer Laboratory\, William Gates Building\, Room FW11
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