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SUMMARY:Modeling Behaviour in Economic Games using Game-Theoretic POMDPs -
  Debajyoti Ray (Gatsby Unit\, UCL)
DTSTART:20080514T130000Z
DTEND:20080514T140000Z
UID:TALK11395@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Zoubin Ghahramani
DESCRIPTION:Economic games such as Dictator\, Ultimatum and Investor-Trust
 ee games have provided an empirical basis for investigating social coopera
 tion and reputation formation. Even in completely anonymous settings\, hum
 an subjects show rich patterns of behaviour that can be seen in terms of p
 ersonality concepts. They also behave as if they model these aspects of ot
 her players in games\, and express different abilities to model their oppo
 nents.\n\nWe have built a generative model of behaviour in multi-round tru
 st games. The critical features are covered using Type parameters for soci
 al utility functions\, and finite cognitive hierarchy levels. This is tied
  together in a game-theoretic Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
  framework. Particle filtering and Point-based Value Iteration is used to 
 get approximations to the system.\n\nThe model is able to capture classes 
 of behaviour in these games. Further it provides more realistic and tracta
 ble explanations of behaviour in these games than other equilibrium notion
 s such as Bayes Nash Equilibria. \n\nWe also consider the recognition mode
 l that is used to fit the parameters for individual interactions. And we'l
 l look at Neuropsychological correlates of our model parameters with actua
 l behaviour in the Investor-Trustee game.\n\nFinally\, l`ll discuss how th
 is model can be extended to capture behaviour in interactions within large
 r groups such as in Public Goods games.
LOCATION:Engineering Department\, CBL Room 438
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