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SUMMARY:Nonhuman episodic memory\, scepticism and psychological kinds - Al
 i Boyle (Trinity Hall\, Cambridge)
DTSTART:20200116T153000Z
DTEND:20200116T170000Z
UID:TALK130693@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Agnes Bolinska
DESCRIPTION:For around 20 years\, a significant research programme in comp
 arative cognition has been investigating whether nonhuman animals have epi
 sodic memory – the form of declarative memory involved in remembering pa
 st events. This research programme has yielded many apparently confirmator
 y results\, across a wide range of species. Yet there is little consensus 
 on whether animals have episodic memory. Why is this? There are a number o
 f grounds for scepticism\, but here I focus on just one family of sceptica
 l views\, which I call 'kind scepticism'. Kind sceptics argue that the evi
 dence doesn't support the hypothesis that animals have episodic memory\, s
 ince it fails to rule out that they have a form of memory that\, though si
 milar to episodic memory\, differs in kind. This raises a difficult questi
 on about how to delineate episodic memory as a psychological kind. I sugge
 st that kind sceptics and advocates of nonhuman episodic memory are commit
 ted to different answers to this question\, and that their disagreement ca
 n't be settled by appeal to the objective structure of the world\, but onl
 y by appeal to pragmatic considerations. This dispute is in a sense termin
 ological\, but significant – since it brings into focus important questi
 ons about what the episodic memory research programme aims to\, and can\, 
 achieve.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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