BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Agency Conflicts\, Macroeconomic Risk\, and Asset Prices - Adelphe
  Ekponon (Cambridge Judge Business School)
DTSTART:20191031T123000Z
DTEND:20191031T133000Z
UID:TALK131806@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Cerf Admin
DESCRIPTION:\nAbstract\nThis paper develops a dynamic corporate finance mo
 del with macroeconomic risk to study the effect of conflicts between insid
 ers and outside investors on the cost of equity. Agency conflicts\, result
 ing from insiders’ willingness to favor their own interests at the expen
 se of the firm are costly and reduce firms’ profit. They are also expose
 d to the business cycle\, leading to time-varying agency costs. To test th
 e model\, I use top measures of agency conflicts and merge them with stock
  returns. The difference in the average value of these indexes in bad comp
 ared to good times is positively correlated to the cost of equity\, even a
 fter controlling for preeminent market factors. Hence\, firms with better 
 governance in bad times have a lower cost of equity. Data are from 1990 to
  2006.\n
LOCATION: W2.02\, Cambridge Judge Business School\, Trumpington Street\, C
 ambridge CB2 1AG
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR