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SUMMARY:Theories of consciousness and animal minds: a modest theoretical p
 roposal - Henry Shevlin (Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence)
DTSTART:20191030T130000Z
DTEND:20191030T143000Z
UID:TALK132097@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Matt Farr
DESCRIPTION:The scientific study of consciousness has made considerable pr
 ogress in the last three decades\, especially among cognitive theories of 
 consciousness such as the Global Neuronal Workspace account\, Higher-order
  Thought theory\, and Attention Schema theory. Such theories are typically
  concerned to identify correlates of conscious and unconscious processing 
 in human beings. However\, in light of heightened recent interest in consc
 iousness in animals and even artificial systems\, a key question for resea
 rchers is whether and how we can apply these frameworks to non-human subje
 cts. In this talk\, I review the prospects of this endeavour and discuss s
 ome challenges. I focus in particular on what I call the Specificity Probl
 em\, which concerns how we can determine an appropriate level of fineness 
 of grain to adopt when moving from human to non-human cases. In light of t
 his and other problems\, I argue that most theories of consciousness curre
 ntly lack the theoretical resources to allow for their straightforward app
 lication to non-humans. However\, I also argue that a purely behavioural a
 pproach to non-human consciousness that eschews explicit theoretical consi
 derations is unlikely to give clear answers to some important cases. Inste
 ad\, I defend what I call a Modest Theoretical Approach\, that aims to com
 bine insights from the theories of consciousness debate with data from beh
 avioural ecology\, comparative neuroscience\, and other sciences of non-hu
 man minds.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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