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SUMMARY:The search for invertebrate consciousness - Jonathan Birch (LSE)
DTSTART:20200205T130000Z
DTEND:20200205T143000Z
UID:TALK132112@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Matt Farr
DESCRIPTION:There is no agreement on whether any invertebrates (e.g. insec
 ts\, spiders\, worms\, octopuses\, crabs) are conscious and no agreement o
 n a methodology that could settle the issue. How can the debate move forwa
 rd? I distinguish three broad types of approach: theory-heavy\, theory-neu
 tral and theory-light. I argue that the theory-heavy and theory-neutral ap
 proaches face serious problems\, motivating a middle path: the theory-ligh
 t approach. At the core of the theory-light approach is a minimal theoreti
 cal commitment about the relation between consciousness and cognition that
  is compatible with many specific theories of consciousness: the hypothesi
 s that conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates\, relative to uncons
 cious perception\, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that st
 imulus. This 'facilitation hypothesis' can productively guide inquiry into
  invertebrate consciousness. What's needed? At this stage\, not more theor
 y\, and not more undirected data gathering. What's needed is a systematic 
 search for consciousness-linked cognitive abilities\, their relationships 
 to each other\, and their sensitivity to masking. I illustrate the 'theory
 -light' approach using the example of bees.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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