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SUMMARY:Topics in Political Philosophy: Luck Egalitarianism &amp\; Compara
 tive Fairness - Ben Jooste-Jennings
DTSTART:20200128T131000Z
DTEND:20200128T140000Z
UID:TALK137818@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Dr Nanna K L Kaalund
DESCRIPTION:According to luck egalitarianism\, it is morally objectionable
  for people to be advantaged or disadvantaged simply because of their good
  or bad luck\; whereas inequalities that people can be said to deserve are
  not morally objectionable. Luck egalitarianism is committed to the implic
 ation that it would be\, to at least some extent\, morally desirable if th
 ose who are better off than others on account of their good luck were made
  worse off than they are now\, even if whatever is taken from the better o
 ff isn’t given to the worse off. Critics have taken this implication to 
 count against luck egalitarianism\, labelling it ‘the levelling down obj
 ection’. So what motivates luck egalitarianism? Temkin\, in his paper 
 ‘Egalitarianism Defended’ (2003) has argued that luck based inequaliti
 es are morally objectionable because they are comparatively unfair. For Te
 mkin\, ‘comparative fairness’ is an independent moral value\, and a de
 viation from this value is pro tanto morally objectionable. I argue that T
 emkin doesn't provide convincing grounds for believing that comparative fa
 irness is a moral value. If my argument is successful\, and we are unconvi
 nced that comparative fairness is a moral value\, the luck egalitarian wil
 l need an alternative justification for why luck based inequalities are mo
 rally objectionable.
LOCATION:The Richard King Room\, Darwin College
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