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SUMMARY:EVALUATION OF BIDDING GROUPS IN FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS - Christine Z
 ulehner\, Professor of Economics\, University of Vienna
DTSTART:20200129T123000Z
DTEND:20200129T140000Z
UID:TALK138076@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Emily Brown
DESCRIPTION:We analyse bidding groups that participate in procurement auct
 ions\, and ask what would have happened in the absence of the joint bid in
  terms of number of bidders and outcome. This counterfactual is of utmost 
 importance in competition policy determining the competitive effects of jo
 int bidding.  With data from the Austrian construction sector\, we estimat
 e models of first price sealed bid auctions with endogenous entry. Based o
 n the estimated bidding distributions and bidders' entry behavior\, we run
  counterfactual simulations. The auctioneer would not benefit from dissolv
 ing bidding groups\, since\, although participation decreases only slightl
 y\, winning bids would increase by about two percent. When bidding groups 
 are forbidden or only small firms are allowed to form bidding groups\, the
 n fewer large firms take part in public procurement auctions and other fir
 ms\, less efficient firms\, enter in the bidding process.
LOCATION:W4.05\, Cambridge Judge Business School
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