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SUMMARY:The shape of the conceptual - Charles Travis (King's College Londo
 n)
DTSTART:20081023T153000Z
DTEND:20081023T170000Z
UID:TALK14109@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Lauren Kassell
DESCRIPTION:Where\, and how\, does thought engage the world? More specific
 ally\, we\, being the sorts of thinkers that we are\, see possibilities fo
 r judgments of certain specific shapes. The world provides certain things 
 to judge about. Why think (or how to see) that the opportunities we (seem 
 to) see are actually provided? Kant thought this _was_ a problem to which 
 there was just one possible solution: 'transcendental idealism'. Frege (as
  extended by Tractarian Wittgenstein) thought this was not a problem\, thu
 s provided\, in effect\, a dissolution. But\, while Kant's conception of t
 he problem lapses into incoherence\, Frege's dissolution will not do (as t
 he _Tractatus_ inadvertently shows). Putnam was the first to see (clearly)
  how to answer the question (in seeing what the shape of the conceptual sh
 ould in fact be taken to be). In this essay\, I try to say what Putnam's r
 esponse to the question is.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, History and Philosophy of Science\, Department o
 f
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