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SUMMARY:The crucial role of truth-compatible interferences - Mira Ariel (T
 el Aviv University)
DTSTART:20201112T163000Z
DTEND:20201112T180000Z
UID:TALK153190@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Tim Laméris
DESCRIPTION:*Registration link* https://forms.gle/jAiDPFv3tJ3XMiSb6\n\n*AB
 STRACT*\n\nEver since the Gricean turn scalar quantifiers (_some\, most_)\
 , numerals\, and connectives _and_ and _or_ have received under-informativ
 e core meanings\, enriched by pragmatic inferences (more recently grammati
 cized according to some). For example\, _some_ and _most_ are assumed to b
 e semantically lower-bounded\, namely also compatible with 100% values\, w
 hile their upper bound ('less than all') is derived separately. _Or_ is as
 sumed to be semantically inclusive\, hence also compatible with states of 
 affairs in which both alternatives are true\, and its supposedly common ex
 clusive interpretation (only one option is true) is similarly separately d
 erived.\n\nI will argue that the quantifiers are semantically upper-bounde
 d\, although a truth-compatible inference may (but need not) bridge the ga
 p between an upper-bounded 'most' and an 'all' state of affairs (Ariel\, 2
 004\, Ariel\, 2015). Indeed\, assertions on subsets may be judged true if 
 these are seen as compatible with 'all' being the case. While my analysis 
 of the quantifiers shows them to be more informative than the consensual a
 ssumption\, my analysis of _or_ (Ariel and Mauri\, 2019) assumes that it h
 as quite a different minimal meaning. _Or_ by itself carries no truth-cond
 itional content (see also Alonso-Ovalle\, 2006) but rather\, a procedural 
 meaning\, imposing an 'alternativity' relation between the disjuncts. The 
 reading associated with the _or_ proposition may be such that none\, one o
 r both disjuncts hold true. Once again\, however\, truth-compatible infere
 nces may (but need not) bridge the gap between a speaker-intended 'single 
 option' and a state of affairs in which 'both' is true (Ariel et al.\, in 
 preparation).\n\nThe take-home message is that truth judgments are not sol
 ely accounted for by reference to 'what is said'/explicatures. Truth-compa
 tible inferences may (but need not) allow for certain discrepancies betwee
 n these representations and the relevant states of affairs. \n
LOCATION:Online
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