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SUMMARY:The politics of money: Presidential power and the Federal Reserve 
 System - Dr Nigel Bowles (University of Oxford)
DTSTART:20220131T170000Z
DTEND:20220131T183000Z
UID:TALK163606@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Dr Duncan Needham
DESCRIPTION:This paper’s subject is the Presidential politics of monetar
 y policy in the United States\; the problem addressed is how two President
 s (Johnson and Nixon) sought to use their authority and power to influence
  that policy. \nThe topic’s significance is that the United States’ ce
 ntral bank\, the Federal Reserve System (the ‘Fed’)\, has nominally co
 mplete authority over the setting of short-term interest rates. Yet the US
  Treasury’s central concern with the pricing of US Treasury securities\,
  every President’s compelling political interest in Fed decisions\, and 
 the Fed’s formal accountability to the US Congress\, obliges all four in
 stitutions to engage with each other about monetary policy on terms that v
 ary with changing political context and the contingencies of personality a
 nd ideology.\nThe cases of Johnson and Nixon suggest that\, despite having
  no formal authority over the central bank beyond nominating its Governors
  and the Board Chairman\, Presidents can have substantial success by confr
 onting the Fed to enforce their preferences upon it provided that the Trea
 sury is supportive\, and Congressional leaders disinclined to resist. Both
  in Johnson’s and in Nixon’s cases\, however\, their successes had dam
 aging consequences for inflation control\, for the dollar and\, in the lon
 g run\, for their own political reputations. \n
LOCATION:John Bradfield Room\, Darwin College and Zoom
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