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SUMMARY:Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design. - Christian Ikeokwu 
 (UC Berkeley)
DTSTART:20220310T160000Z
DTEND:20220310T170000Z
UID:TALK169184@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Artem Khovanov
DESCRIPTION:Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are informal
  financial organizations common in settings where communities have reduced
  access to formal institutions. In a rosca\, a fixed group of participants
  regularly contribute sums of money to a pot. This pot is then allocated p
 eriodically using lottery\, aftermarket\, or auction mechanisms. Roscas ar
 e empirically well-studied in the economics literature. Due to their dynam
 ic nature\, however\, roscas have proven challenging to study theoreticall
 y\, and typical economic economic analyses stop at coarse ordinal welfare 
 comparisons to other credit allocation mechanisms and leave much of roscas
 ’ ubiquity unexplained. This work takes an algorithmic perspective on th
 e study of roscas. We present worst-case welfare approximation guarantees\
 , building on tools from the price of anarchy. These cardinal welfare anal
 yses help rationalize the prevalence of roscas. We conclude by discussing 
 several other promising avenues.
LOCATION:Google Meet - https://meet.google.com/vik-qerr-bwi
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