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SUMMARY:The grammar of self-talk. What different modes of talking reveal a
 bout the language faculty.  - Martina Wiltschko (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
DTSTART:20220519T153000Z
DTEND:20220519T170000Z
UID:TALK172469@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Javier Moreno
DESCRIPTION:There is an ancient debate about whether language is an instru
 ment for thought or for communication. I argue that the distinction is mis
 leading\, and that language is an integral part of both\, human-specific t
 hought and communication. The argument is based on the growing consensus t
 hat grammatical knowledge - a hallmark of human language - encompasses not
  only the propositional content of an utterance but also its communicative
  content. If communicative content is regulated by grammatical knowledge\,
  then it follows that communication is as much a function of language as t
 hought is. I here adopt Wiltschko’s 2021 proposal according to which the
  grammar of interaction consists of 3 layers: a speaker-oriented grounding
  layer\, an addressee-oriented grounding layer and a response layer. In th
 is talk I use restrictions on self-talk to show that indeed grammatical kn
 owledge regulates communication and that the interactional structure captu
 res these restrictions straightforwardly. Holmberg 2010 shows that there a
 re two different modes of self-talk: I-centered self-talk (I can do this) 
 and you-centered self-talk (You can do this). These two modes of self-talk
  come with different grammatical restrictions. What sets apart I-centered 
 self-talk from you-centered self-talk is the presence of this addressee ro
 le: I-centered self-talk is a way of thinking out loud and thus lacks the 
 addressee role\, you-centered self-talk is a conversation with oneself and
  thus the addressee role is present. According to this analysis\, you-cent
 ered self-talk is more complex than I-centered self-talk. This provides us
  with an empirical argument for the view that the addressee-role is genera
 ted higher than that of the speaker role. \nEvidence that the addressee-ro
 le is a grammatical construct (and not only a pragmatically constructed sp
 eech act role) comes from the fact that even in self-talk when the speaker
  is identical to the addressee the same constraints on the addressee hold 
 as in other-oriented conversations. Specifically\, one does not have acces
 s to the addressee’s mental state. Significantly\, the same is true in s
 elf-talk despite the fact that one has access to one’s own mind. This de
 monstrates that grammar treats the Addressee as someone whose mind is inac
 cessible\, no matter whether in the real world this mind is in fact access
 ible. Real world knowledge cannot override grammatical constraints. Finall
 y\, I show that other-oriented talk (i.e.\, regular conversations) differ 
 from both modes of self-talk in the presence of the response-layer which r
 egulates turn-taking. In sum\, the goal of this talk is to show that self-
 talk provides us with a new window into the grammar of interactional langu
 age.
LOCATION:English Faculty\, GR04
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