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SUMMARY:Denying religious exemptions to secure LGBTQ+ equality - Sam Cole\
 , Philosophy
DTSTART:20240220T183000Z
DTEND:20240220T193000Z
UID:TALK210205@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Dr Stefanie Ullmann
DESCRIPTION:Should a liberal state grant religious vendors exemptions to g
 enerally applicable antidiscrimination law so they may refuse service to L
 GBTQ+ customers in the marketplace\, such as in the provision of wedding c
 akes to same-sex couples? Andrew Koppelman thinks those exemptions are war
 ranted when the marketplace is competitive enough that LGBTQ+ customers ca
 n acquire the goods they are denied elsewhere at roughly equal cost and qu
 ality. I suggest that this presents a problem for opponents of such exempt
 ions in the competitive marketplace: it seems to make every party better o
 ff in terms of opportunities to achieve their conception of the good. LGBT
 Q+ citizens can still acquire goods and do not suffer material harms. Mean
 while\, religious citizens now escape violating their religious commitment
 s that are imperilled by serving LGBTQ+ customers. There is a 'trade-in'\,
  rather than a trade-off\, of citizens’ interests here.\n \nI assume tha
 t liberal states ought to decide exemptions cases on the basis of a libera
 l-neutral or public reason framework. That kind of framework is ultimately
  concerned with respecting the equal standing of citizens through securing
  their shared interests. Since the equal standing of citizens is defined a
 s opportunities to exercise their moral powers to achieve and revise a con
 ception of the good\, and hold a sense of justice\, it seems there is a cl
 ear case for allowing exemptions to discriminate against LGBTQ+ customers 
 in a competitive marketplace.\n \nThis paper objects to that conclusion by
  noting a crucial assumption in the foregoing argument: the equal standing
  of citizens is necessarily linked or reduced to opportunities to achieve 
 one’s conception of the good or one’s commitments. Consequently\, gran
 ting (or denying) religious exemptions follows a logic of ‘balancing’ 
 between different citizens’ conceptions of the good implicit in many app
 roaches in the literature. But why should we link citizens’ standing to 
 conceptions of the good in this context?\n \nI identify two kinds of (publ
 ic) justification for this reductionist assumption in the literature that 
 appeal to the interests of religious citizens: fair opportunity and integr
 ity. I critique both\, weakening the case for exemptions to discriminate a
 gainst LGBTQ+ customers and showing that they may not justify religious ex
 emptions in other similar cases either\, generally speaking.\n \nFirst\, J
 onathan Quong and Jonathan Seglow have suggested citizens share interests 
 in opportunities to combine religious or cultural pursuits with important 
 civic opportunities such as employment and education. I argue that Quong
 ’s argument for exemptions relies on a faulty analogy while Seglow’s a
 rgument relies on a misunderstanding of the value of nonexploitation or fa
 ir play between religious citizens and wider society.\n \nSecond\, there i
 s an integrity-based justification for religious exemptions championed by 
 Cécile Laborde and Paul Bou-Habib. I suggest that the integrity interests
  of LGBTQ+ citizens are also at stake in the case we are considering – a
 nd there are reasons to think that it is in fact more at stake by granting
  an exemption. At the same time\, religious integrity is much less burdene
 d by serving LGBTQ+ customers than proponents of exemptions think.
LOCATION:Richard King room\, Darwin College
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