BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Inferring from negative analogies: lessons on analogical reasoning
  from clinical medical practice - Helene Scott-Fordsmand (Department of Hi
 story and Philosophy of Science)
DTSTART:20240313T130000Z
DTEND:20240313T143000Z
UID:TALK211564@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Neil Dewar
DESCRIPTION:Joint work with Mauricio Suárez.\n\nOne of Mary Hesse's major
  contributions to the philosophy of science is her work on analogical reas
 oning. Since the publication of _Models and Analogies in Science_ (1966)\,
  her schematization of the problem has become the disciplinary standard. I
 n this paper we want to bring attention to an element of the schematizatio
 n which has been left remarkably underexplored\, namely the negative analo
 gies. We will argue that there is a host of functions for negative analogi
 es in reasoning\, and that\, importantly\, they have a 'positive' inferent
 ial potential. We map out three well-known relation-establishing functions
  of negative analogies – 'crucial'\, irrelevant\, and required negative 
 analogies (Bartha 2010\, Pero & Suárez 2016\, Boesch 2021) – as well as
  a potentially problematic kind of negative analogy which we term 'scope-f
 ixing negative analogies' (from Bailer-Jones 2002). We end by drawing on a
  case study from clinical practice – the use of the Neer Classification 
 schema for the classification of shoulder fractures. Exploring the ways cl
 inicians reason with this schema\, we suggest there are two ways in which 
 negative analogies can serve an inferential function in reasoning\, and he
 nce\, can be seen as having a positive epistemic potential.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR