BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Strategic Disclosure with Fake and Real News - Ilan Guttman (NYU S
 tern0
DTSTART:20250130T123000Z
DTEND:20250130T133000Z
UID:TALK218377@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Cerf Admin
DESCRIPTION:We develop a model in which information about a rm's value can
  be obtained\nfrom two sources: (i) voluntary disclosure by a rm's manager
 \, if she is informed\, and (ii) an exogenous source - news - with uncerta
 in accuracy\, i.e.\, who may be real or fake. We focus on the case where t
 he accuracy of the news is positively correlated with the manager's inform
 ation endowment\, and the manager makes the disclosure decision without kn
 owing the news. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature\, our m
 odel does not admit a pure-strategy disclosure equilibrium. Instead\, the 
 equilibrium is characterized by two thresholds: an informed manager never 
 discloses values below the lower threshold\, always discloses values above
  the higher threshold\, and employs a mixed strategy with a monotonically 
 increasing probability of disclosure for values between the two thresholds
 . We show that the presence of news crowds out managerial disclosure.
LOCATION:W2.01\, CJBS
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR