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SUMMARY:Aggregation and Convexity in the Provision of Dynamic Incentives -
  Thomas Hemmer (Rice Business School)
DTSTART:20250619T120000Z
DTEND:20250619T130000Z
UID:TALK218398@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Cerf Admin
DESCRIPTION:In this paper I identify an alternative preference structure t
 hat preserves most of the cherished simplicity of the formulation of the P
 rincipal-Agent problem pioneered by Holmstr¨om and Milgrom (1987). The ma
 in advantage of my approach is in relation to the structure of the optimal
  contract: it adds a convex component to their optimal linear contract. Th
 is provides new opportunities to revisit empirical predictions and studies
  based o↵ of their linear formulation and to demonstrate how the empiric
 al irregularities may be at least partially explained by this one addition
 al component identified here.
LOCATION:W2.01\, CJBS
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