BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Aristotle on what geometry is about - Chiara Martini (Corpus Chris
 ti College\, Cambridge)
DTSTART:20250521T120000Z
DTEND:20250521T133000Z
UID:TALK231202@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Miguel Ohnesorge
DESCRIPTION:In _Metaphysics_ M.3\, Aristotle puts forward two main claims.
  He argues (i) that geometry is about sensible objects\, but not _qua_ sen
 sible\, and (ii) that geometers can posit as separate what is not separate
 \, and consider it as such. I believe that the two statements are not two 
 reformulations of the same idea\, but two distinct claims\, aimed at solvi
 ng two different problems: the Grounding Question (what makes geometrical 
 statements true?) and the Reference Question (what do the singular terms i
 n geometrical statements refer to?). I submit that\, contrary to our expec
 tations\, in Aristotle’s account the answers to these two questions come
  apart. This is because the ontology that seems to be implicit in geometri
 cal practice and language is at odds with Aristotle’s metaphysical commi
 tments.\n\nThe _qua_-theory is offered as an account of geometrical truth\
 , while the doctrine of separation is supposed to account for geometrical 
 practice and for the way in which geometers speak of the objects they stud
 y. I give a radically anti-Platonist account of geometrical truth\, accord
 ing to which Aristotle does not need to introduce any kind of object that 
 is specific to geometry (not even objects that depend for their existence 
 on sensible substances): geometry is true in virtue of sensible substances
  and their properties. However\, I believe that Aristotle relies on a mode
 rate form of fictionalism (which only concerns the mode of being of the en
 tities in question) in order to account for geometrical practice.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR