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SUMMARY:Criminal sanctions to protect the environment: Economics\, law\, a
 nd empirical evidence - Dr Timo Goeschl\, University of Heidelberg\, Germa
 ny
DTSTART:20100217T160000Z
DTEND:20100217T170000Z
UID:TALK23276@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Dr A. Zabala
DESCRIPTION:About the speaker:\n\nTimo Goeschl is Professor of Economics a
 nd Director of the Research Center for Environmental Economics at the Univ
 ersity of Heidelberg\, Germany. He previously taught at the University of 
 Wisconsin-Madison and the University of Cambridge. His research interests 
 are in Environmental and Resource Economics\, the Economics of Regulation\
 , and Law and Economics.\n\nAbout the seminar:\n\nUS and EU environmental 
 policy employ criminal sanctions to enforce compliance. This presentation 
 will summarize the results of three recent papers that *examine the empiri
 cal economics of using criminal sanctions for regulating environmental off
 ences*. After some general policy background on the use of criminal sancti
 ons in an environmental context\, the first set of results will deal with 
 the *empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of criminal sanctions*. Th
 is part exploits a unique dataset to study the deterrent effect of crimina
 l enforcement. The dynamic panel data analysis drawing on 15 German states
  and the time period from 1995 to 2005 leads to three findings. First\, cr
 iminal sanctions do provide the intended deterrent effects. Second\, stand
 ing trial provides one of the most significant deterrents\, rather than th
 e probability of conviction or the magnitude of fines. Third\, public pref
 erences regarding environmental quality and political economy variables af
 fect reported environmental crime. The second set of results examines the 
 *effectiveness of criminal sanctioning in the sub-category of illegal wast
 e disposals*\, which are one of the most important sources of environmenta
 l pollution worldwide. It does so at the county level with a single German
  state (Baden-Württemberg). The results broadly confirm and extend the fi
 ndings at the federal level in the first part. At the same time\, there is
  evidence that violations are treated differently depending on their local
  political economy context. The third set of results studies the *determin
 ants of enforcement decisions at the levels of the police\, prosecutors\, 
 and judges*. It assess the role of political factors in enforcement decisi
 ons and compares their relative weight at different levels. There is evide
 nce for the presence of both opportunity cost considerations and political
  factors at all levels. In relative terms\, the role of the political fact
 ors does not align with the degree of constitutional independence.
LOCATION:Mill Lane Lecture Rooms\, Room 1
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