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SUMMARY:On Bayes-Nash implementation of combinatorial auctions: structure 
 and efficiency - Hajek\, B (Illinois)
DTSTART:20100317T150000Z
DTEND:20100317T170000Z
UID:TALK23769@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Mustapha Amrani
DESCRIPTION:In the first hour of this two-part presentation\, an overview 
 of combinatorial auction theory is given\, including its use in spectrum a
 uctions. Also included is an overview of the structure of Bayesian optimal
  auctions\, along the lines of Myerson\, but for discrete-valued valuation
 s. A novel graphical construction of virtual valuations is provided. In th
 e second part of the presentation\, the problem of characterising revenue 
 optimal auctions for single-minded buyers is discussed\, meaning each buye
 r is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the
  same\, and both the choice of bundle and the value are private informatio
 n. The talk will also address the question of how efficient the revenue op
 timal auction is. (Based on joint work with Vineet Abhishek).
LOCATION:Seminar Room 1 Newton Institute
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