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SUMMARY:Group Identity in One-shot and Repeated Coalition Formation Games 
 - James Tremewan\, Toulouse School of Economics/ the Stockholm Institute f
 or Transition Economies
DTSTART:20101105T113000Z
DTEND:20101105T123000Z
UID:TALK27777@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Donna Harris
DESCRIPTION:This paper is an experimental study on the effect of group ide
 ntity on the formation of coalitions and the resulting distribution of res
 ources\, both in a one-shot and repeated game environment. After inducing 
 group identity based on preferences over paintings\, subjects play symmetr
 ic three-player ``divide the dollar'' games with a majority rule decision 
 process. The main finding is that where two players are from one group and
  one from the other\, those in the minority earn significantly less than m
 ajority players. Although the size of this effect is similar in both one-s
 hot and repeated games\, the mechanisms involved differ: there is evidence
  only of costless types of discrimination in the one-shot context\, wherea
 s in the repeated game subjects engage in potentially costly discriminatio
 n. This is conjectured to occur because of the future gains that may be ac
 crued by establishing a more stable long-term coalition.\n\n
LOCATION:the Marshall Room\, Faculty of Economics\, Sidgwick Site
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