BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Bumping attacks: the affordable way of obtaining chip secrets - Se
 rgei Skorobogatov - Computer Laboratory ( University of Cambridge)
DTSTART:20101207T161500Z
DTEND:20101207T171500Z
UID:TALK28204@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Wei Ming Khoo
DESCRIPTION:This talk presents a new class of fault injection attacks call
 ed bumping attacks. These attacks are aimed at data extraction from secure
  embedded memory\, which usually stores critical parts of algorithms\, sen
 sitive data and cryptographic keys. As a security measure\, read-back acce
 ss to the memory is not implemented leaving only authentication and verifi
 cation options for integrity check. Verification is usually performed on r
 elatively large blocks of data\, making a brute force searching infeasible
 . I will evaluate memory verification and AES authentication schemes used 
 in secure microcontrollers and a highly secure FPGA. By attacking the secu
 rity in three steps\, the search space can be reduced from infeasible 2 to
  the 100 to affordable 2 to the 15 guesses per block of data. This develop
 ment was achieved by finding a way to preset certain bits in the data path
  to a known state using semi-invasive optical bumping. Further improvement
 s to these attacks involved using non-invasive power glitching technique f
 or the secure microcontroller. Partial reverse engineering of the FPGA mad
 e bumping attacks possible via the use of non-invasive threshold voltage a
 lteration combined with power glitching. Research into positioning and tim
 ing dependency showed that Flash memory bumping attacks are relatively eas
 y to carry out.
LOCATION:Lecture Theatre 2\, Computer Laboratory\, William Gates Building
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR