BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk// X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:"\;Probable"\;\, Alternatives\, and Rationality - Dan Lass iter\, Dept. of Linguistics\, NYU and Institute of Philosophy\, University of London DTSTART:20110218T160000Z DTEND:20110218T170000Z UID:TALK29941@talks.cam.ac.uk CONTACT:Bert Vaux DESCRIPTION:On most theories\, "probable" is equivalent to "more probable than not"\, interpreted either as comparative epistemic possibility (e.g.\ , Kratzer) or as numerical probability (> 50%). Psychological experiments have revealed that subjects' willingness to judge an event "probable" depe nds on the distribution of alternatives: in particular\, most subjects are willing to judge an event "probable" if it is more probable than all cont extual alternatives\, even if it is clearly less probable than its negatio n. Since this conflicts with the definition of "probable" assumed\, these results have been taken as evidence that people's judgments about probabil ity are illogical or incoherent\, and that probability judgments are made according to a "gut-level"\, "associative" system. I give an alternative s emantic analysis based on comparison classes\, which is independently moti vated by the fact that "probable" is focus-sensitive\, and develop it with in standard degree-based semantics for adjectives and Beaver & Clark's sem antics for focus. This relieves us of the need to treat the behavior of ex perimental subjects as systematically illogical\, which I take to be a goo d thing on charity grounds: plausibly\, the only fallacy here is in the ex perimenters' semantic assumptions. LOCATION:Wine Room\, King's College\, Cambridge END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR