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SUMMARY:History and philosophy of biology: new perspectives? - Joeri Witte
 veen (Department of History and Philosophy of Science) and Pierre-Olivier 
 Méthot (University of Exeter)
DTSTART:20110601T120000Z
DTEND:20110601T130000Z
UID:TALK30779@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau
DESCRIPTION:*Pierre-Olivier Méthot - 'On the operational character of con
 cepts in the life sciences: historical and philosophical perspectives'*\n\
 nPhilosophers of science have traditionally been concerned with achieving 
 clarity in scientific concepts through logical analysis of language. In th
 e \nrecent past this concern was often addressed in the context of theoret
 ical reductionism and unity of science. Nowadays\, however\, while philoso
 phers \ncontinue to value clarity and precision in scientific concepts the
 y have also concluded that concepts 'in flux'\, 'in tension'\, in addition
  to 'boundary' concepts\, do not hold back the development of the sciences
  but rather make it possible. It then becomes pertinent to ask how and why
  fuzzy concepts are capable of having a positive effect on science. Drawin
 g on the work of historian of science Andrew Mendelsohn (2002) I will sugg
 est that in the life sciences\, concepts in flux often achieve this goal i
 n virtue of their operational character.\n\n*Joeri Witteveen - 'Mayr on "t
 ypological thinking": the integrated HPS of muddled metaphysics and tacit 
 tactics'*\n\nAmong the legacy of the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr is 
 a slew of conceptual dichotomies\, some of which have met strong criticism
  from historians and philosophers. One the most influential and controvers
 ial distinctions he coined\, was one between 'typological thinking' and 'p
 opulation thinking'. Historians who traced the origination history of \nth
 is distinction have come to conclude that Mayr used it as a mere tactical 
 device that suited his agenda. They argue that the distinction is without 
 \nsubstance and that its terms changed reference freely\, according to his
  shifting programmatic objectives. I will argue that this line of argument
  \nis only partially correct. Further examination of Mayr's writings revea
 ls that he was referring to different 'type concepts' at different times\,
  \nwhich he collapsed into one term that could be contrasted with 'populat
 ion thinking'. Disentangling 'typological thinking' shows how his distinct
 ion \ncan come to mark real contrasts in biological theory and practice. W
 hether or not it was deliberate\, muddling the metaphysics of types helped
  Mayr to \ndeploy his tacit tactics.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 1\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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