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SUMMARY:The equivocation objection to priority monism - Emily Thomas (Facu
 lty of Philosophy)
DTSTART:20111116T130000Z
DTEND:20111116T140000Z
UID:TALK33303@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:22487
DESCRIPTION:Fundamentality theorists may agree that the same objects exist
  - such as tables\, mountains\, electrons and people - but they may also d
 isagree as to which of these entities are ontologically fundamental. In a 
 number of recent papers\, Jonathan Schaffer has argued for 'priority monis
 m'\, a doctrine which holds that the uppermost mereological whole is funda
 mental and all of its mereological parts are ontologically dependent\, der
 ivative entities. I will show that Schaffer's central argument masks a cru
 cial\nequivocation - between 'Aristotelian unities' and 'mereological whol
 es' - that\, when uncovered\, seriously weakens the case for priority moni
 sm.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 1\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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