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SUMMARY:On the Tradeoff between Economic Efficiency and Strategyproofness 
 in Randomized Social Choice - Markus Brill (TU Munich)
DTSTART:20121112T150000Z
DTEND:20121112T160000Z
UID:TALK40669@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Felix Fischer
DESCRIPTION:Two fundamental notions in microeconomic theory are _efficienc
 y_--no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off--
 and _strategyproofness_--no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by m
 isrepresenting his preferences. When social outcomes are probability distr
 ibutions (or lotteries) over alternatives\, there are varying degrees of t
 hese notions depending on how preferences over alternatives are extended t
 o preference over lotteries. We show that efficiency and strategyproofness
  are incompatible to some extent when preferences are defined using stocha
 stic dominance (SD) and therefore introduce a natural weakening of SD base
 d on Savage’s sure-thing principle (ST). While _random serial dictatorsh
 ip_ is SD-strategyproof\, it only satisfies ST-efficiency. Our main result
  is that _strict maximal lotteries_--an appealing class of social decision
  schemes due to Kreweras and Fishburn--satisfy SD-efficiency and ST-strate
 gyproofness.
LOCATION:MR12\, Centre for Mathematical Sciences\, Wilberforce Road\, Camb
 ridge
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