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SUMMARY:The Political Causes and Strategic Consequences of Global Economic
  Engagement - Dr. David Blagden\, Post-doctoral Research Associate\, Centr
 e for Rising Powers\, University of Cambridge\; Adrian Research Fellow in 
 International Politics\, Darwin College
DTSTART:20130201T120000Z
DTEND:20130201T130000Z
UID:TALK41681@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Dan Kim
DESCRIPTION:Recent research by Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley (Internatio
 nal Organization\, Winter 2011) demonstrates that the US executive branch 
 overwhelmingly supports global economic engagement. This is surprising\, b
 ecause economic theory and evidence demonstrates that while such engagemen
 t may maximize total world output\, it can also cause follower economies t
 o grow faster than leading economies\, eroding the latter’s relative lea
 d. Given that the national economic base is the fungible resource that und
 erpins a state’s power – including the ability to procure military for
 ces – this implies that the US executive is overwhelmingly supportive of
  an economic process that can weaken its own state’s relative power posi
 tion. \n\nDrawing on rationalist theory that explains how states respectiv
 ely privilege security and consumption (“guns versus butter”)\, and ut
 ilizing indifference curve analysis to support its point\, this paper argu
 es that the executive’s observed preference for engagement – which max
 imizes present prosperity at the expense of the state’s long-term power 
 position – can be explained by national leaders’ discount rates. Put s
 imply\, presidents do not reap a political reward if their state preserves
  its power position over a decade-plus time horizon\, but they pay a polit
 ical price if economic growth is weak today and tomorrow\, and this is ref
 lected in their respective prioritization of future standing and current g
 rowth. In addition to the contemporary context of relative US decline and 
 the emergence of new great powers\, most notably China\, such an argument 
 also has applicability to other great powers – even those with non-presi
 dential systems of executive governance – that have played a role in dri
 ving their own relative decline by facilitating the catch-up growth of oth
 er great powers’ economies in past historical epochs. The Dutch Republic
  in the eighteenth century and Great Britain in the late nineteenth and ea
 rly twentieth centuries are particularly relevant cases.
LOCATION:S3 (Third Floor)\, Alison Richard Building\, 7 West Road\, Univer
 sity of Cambridge
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