BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Handling Multitude of Nash Equilibria in Voting Games - Omer Lev\,
  Hebrew University of Jerusalem
DTSTART:20121128T140000Z
DTEND:20121128T150000Z
UID:TALK41804@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins
DESCRIPTION:\nFollowing an introduction to voting and to the Nash equilibr
 ium concept we will present two papers which attempt to deal with the mult
 itude of Nash equilibria in voting games in different ways. First\, we wil
 l expand on an iterative process which enables us (or doesn't...) to reach
  a specific equilibrium in the game\, under different voting systems and d
 epending on various criteria. Further on\, we examine some of the characte
 ristics of the equilibria in simple plurality games\, using empirical work
 \, which we manage to examine by making a small\, natural change to the vo
 ters' incentives\, which turns out helps the game quite significantly.
LOCATION:Small lecture theatre\, Microsoft Research Ltd\, 7 J J Thomson Av
 enue (Off Madingley Road)\, Cambridge
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR