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SUMMARY:Mechanism design: dealing with interdependencies among agents. - S
 ofia Ceppi\, Politecnico di Milano
DTSTART:20130320T110000Z
DTEND:20130320T120000Z
UID:TALK43939@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins
DESCRIPTION:Scenarios like recommendation systems are characterized by the
  presence of agents that play the role of experts by observing how much en
 d-users would be interested in an item. However\, their observations are s
 ubject to noise. To improve the service offered to end-users\, a central a
 gent can collect all the observations and deal with the noise by merging t
 hem\, before deciding which items to propose to an end-user. This merging 
 gives rise to interdependencies among the experts (who have a value/cost f
 or the items when it is chosen by the end-user)\, that\, in turn\, create 
 externalities effects.\nIn this talk\, this kind of scenario is analyzed\,
  different types of externalities due to interdependency are described\, a
 nd possibility and impossibility results in designing efficient\, incentiv
 e compatible\, individually rational\, and weakly budget balanced mechanis
 ms are presented. In the case study considered in this presentation\, a fe
 derated search engine collects ads from a set of advertising providers\, a
 nd decides which ads to display to a specific end-user.
LOCATION:Auditorium\, Microsoft Research Ltd\, 21 Station Road\, Cambridge
 \, CB1 2FB
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