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SUMMARY:King of the Middle East: Using Game Theory to understand the resil
 ience of monarchy in Jordan - Nikita Malik
DTSTART:20130611T121000Z
DTEND:20130611T130000Z
UID:TALK44475@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Xinyi Liu
DESCRIPTION:On one side we have the so-called 'successes' of the Arab Spri
 ng: Egypt and Tunisia (which have experienced regime change or civil war)\
 , compared to those that have been situated in the academic literature as 
 the 'unfinished' revolutions: Libya\, Bahrain\, Syria\, and Yemen\, and fi
 nally the eight Arab monarchies: Saudi Arabia\, Oman\, Qatar\, the UAE\, J
 ordan\, Morocco\, Kuwait\, and Bahrain. In comparison to the former two\, 
 these states stand firm. My thesis aims to understand why this is. Are mon
 archies simply more durable systems of governance in this part of the worl
 d? Or is there more to the story?\n\nThe monarchies under question differ 
 significantly in size and social makeup. Social cleavages and fragmentatio
 ns within each society vary considerably as well - tribalism has long been
  an important influence within all the Gulf states\, East Bank Jordanians\
 , and among some segments of the Moroccan population. Adding to this debat
 e are markedly different degrees of constitutional constraint and parliame
 ntary traditions. Liberalizing monarchs tend to maintain their power throu
 gh fragmenting opposition groups\, systems of patronage\, and divide-and-r
 ule tactics. In Jordan\, for example\, there was no democratization after 
 the initial period of liberalizing reform in the 1990s - rather\, election
 s\, parties\, and parliament became less significant. In Morocco\, the ini
 tial reforms instituted by Mohammed VI left the power of the palace and it
 s elites intact. As such\, monarchs retain the ability to delay\, reverse\
 , or undercut reforms.\n\nMy PhD aims to move beyond simple binaries: 'mon
 archy does or does not matter' to explore specific mechanisms by which it 
 might matter. I want to weigh these mechanisms with competing explanations
 \, and show how monarchy operates in a particular case I know well: Jordan
 . At the outset\, it is obvious that different regime types will create di
 fferent incentives\, institutions\, and possibilities for political conten
 tion. However\, how this applies in the Jordanian case - both theoreticall
 y and empirically - is something I aim to establish. 
LOCATION:The Richard King Room\, Darwin College
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