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SUMMARY:“When is fair sharing optimal?” - Yair Zick\, Nanyang Technolo
 gical University\, Singapore
DTSTART:20130724T130000Z
DTEND:20130724T140000Z
UID:TALK46418@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins
DESCRIPTION:We consider revenue division problems in iterative settings. I
 n our model\, a group of agents has some initial resources\, used in order
  to generate revenue. At every time-step\, the revenue shares received at 
 time t are agent resources at time t+1\, and the game is repeated. The key
  issue here is that the way resources are shared has a dramatic effect on 
 long-term social welfare\, so in order to maximize individual long-term re
 venue one must consider the welfare of others\, a behaviour not captured b
 y other models of cooperation among economic agents. Our work focuses on a
  setting where agents must agree on a single revenue sharing contract at t
 ime 0\, and continue using that contract indefinitely. We identify conditi
 ons that ensure that no agent regrets choosing the initial agreement\, nam
 ely that the utility function is concave and homogeneous of degree greater
  or equal to 1. We apply our results to some families of utility functions
 \, and discuss their implication in these domains. Finally\, we contrast o
 ur proposed revenue sharing scheme with the well-known core revenue sharin
 g scheme for network flow games. We show that our proposed method better r
 ewards agents with larger initial edge capacities\; this is rather unlike 
 the canonical core revenue sharing scheme\, which pays only the edges in t
 he minimum cut of the graph.
LOCATION: Microsoft Research Ltd\, 21 Station Road\, Cambridge\, CB1 2FB
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