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SUMMARY:There are mechanisms – and then there are mechanisms - Nancy Car
 twright (Durham University and UCSD)
DTSTART:20140515T153000Z
DTEND:20140515T170000Z
UID:TALK51899@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Helen Curry
DESCRIPTION:Mechanisms are all the rage in philosophy of science now and i
 n a number of scientific domains as well. What then is a mechanism? I shal
 l describe three senses common in philosophy: 1) invariant relations (spon
 sored by James Woodward)\, 2) causal processes (probably the usual sense i
 n medical literature) and 3) relatively fixed arrangements of parts that a
 ct together to afford or explain causal regularities (defended by William 
 Bechtel and by MDC: Machamer\, Craver and Darden). I claim these are disti
 nct senses. But Peter Menzies claims that by employing a 'structural equat
 ions' framework\, one can in one fell swoop use 1) the invariant-relations
  idea to give a much needed explication of the idea of 'action' central to
  3) and thereby give a much needed account of how mechanisms in sense 3) e
 xplain causal regularities.\n\nI think Menzies is really dealing with 2) c
 ausal processes all along\; his account has no space for 3) parts and thei
 r actions. But we need to keep this third sense of 'mechanism' centre-stag
 e because it is correct that it is mechanisms in this sense that underwrit
 e the familiar causal processes we rely on throughout daily life and much 
 of science and policy. Without attention to the mechanisms (sense 3)) that
  afford causal regularities we have no idea how far they stretch nor when 
 and where they will break down. Looking at Menzies' valiant attempt\, as I
  shall do\, and seeing how\, if I am right\, it fails shows just how true 
 this is. I shall illustrate with some examples from child welfare and deve
 lopment policy.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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