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SUMMARY:Perceptual knowledge and discrimination (work in progress) - Dunca
 n Pritchard (University of Stirling)
DTSTART:20061102T163000Z
DTEND:20061102T180000Z
UID:TALK5274@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Stephen John
DESCRIPTION:This paper discusses the relationship between perceptual knowl
 edge and discrimination. In particular\, it argues for a re-evaluation of 
 a range of cases that have been central to epistemological discussion and 
 which have prompted some to question the truth of certain highly plausible
  epistemic principles\, such as the 'closure' principle for knowledge. It 
 is claimed that provided one has the right understanding of the perceptual
  knowledge at issue in these cases\, then they pose no problem for such pr
 inciples. Furthermore\, it is argued that accepting these principles does 
 not commit one to a 'discrimination' principle for knowledge\, a principle
  that can initially seem plausible but which places an unduly austere cons
 traint on knowledge. Finally\, it is claimed that further support for this
  picture of the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discriminati
 on can be gleaned by considering the conditions under which claims to know
  are inappropriate\, and by distinguishing the cases under discussion from
  sceptical cases which\, it is argued\, require a separate treatment\, des
 pite being apparently analogous.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, History and Philosophy of Science\, Department o
 f
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