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SUMMARY:Lottery Auctions - Nicola Dimitri\, Department of Political Econom
 y &amp\; Statistics\, University of Siena\, Ital
DTSTART:20141009T090000Z
DTEND:20141009T100000Z
UID:TALK54939@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins
DESCRIPTION:The talk discusses some single object sale lottery auctions (L
 A)\, where the winner is randomly drawn\, with a probability proportional 
 to the price bid. Such auctions are similar to commonly used formats of na
 tional and charity lotteries (NCL)\, where the winning probability depends
  on the number of tickets bought. However\, LA differ from NCL since the o
 bject value is not endogenously determined by the amount invested by parti
 cipants but rather is exogenous. For this reason the LA we study are more 
 akin to contests "a là Tullock". In particular\, we consider a form of "s
 econd price lottery auction". Unlike the standard Vickrey auction\, an int
 eresting result in the simplest model with two players and complete inform
 ation is that in the only Nash Equilibrium where both players submit a pos
 itive price\, bidders may reveal the opponent's value and not their own va
 lue. For this reason\, we named this "mirror revelation".
LOCATION:Auditorium\, Microsoft Research Ltd\, 21 Station Road\, Cambridge
 \, CB1 2FB
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