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SUMMARY:Information Management in Banking Crises - Skeie\, D (Texas A&amp\
 ;M University)
DTSTART:20141218T100000Z
DTEND:20141218T104500Z
UID:TALK56692@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Mustapha Amrani
DESCRIPTION:Co-author: Joel Shapiro (University of Oxford) \n\nA regulator
  resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors\, who may run if they be
 lieve the regulator will not provide capital\, and banks\, which may take 
 excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the r
 egulator's cost of injecting capital is private information\, it manages e
 xpectations by using costly signals: (i) A regulator with a low cost of in
 jecting capital may forbear on bad banks to signal toughness and reduce ri
 sk taking\, and (ii) A regulator with a high cost of injecting capital may
  bail out bad banks to increase confidence and prevent runs.\n
LOCATION:Seminar Room 1\, Newton Institute
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