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SUMMARY:Does the missing fundamental require an inferentialist explanation
 ? - Jenny Judge (Centre for Music and Science\, Cambridge)
DTSTART:20150204T130000Z
DTEND:20150204T143000Z
UID:TALK57302@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Christopher Clarke
DESCRIPTION:Philosophers and music psychologists rarely interact. In my do
 ctoral thesis\, I explain the origins of this impasse\, and I argue that b
 oth disciplines would benefit from a rapprochement. In this talk\, I\nexpl
 ore what the philosophy of science might have to say about a particular ex
 planatory strategy that is often taken by psychologists (both of music and
  of hearing) in order to explain the workings of the\nauditory system — 
 namely\, the appeal to 'perceptual inference'.\n\nPerceptual systems are s
 ometimes said to perform 'inferences' in order to figure out what's in the
  environment. According to the people who appeal to perceptual inference 
 — the 'inferentialists' — perceivers don't have direct\, unmediated ac
 cess to the world. The world appears as it does because our perceptual sys
 tems construct it to appear that way\,\nand this construction happens by m
 eans of the performance of inferences. Perceptual systems\, it is thought\
 , have to make 'educated guesses' about what is in the world\, because the
  stimulus\, with which\nthey are presented\, is not sufficiently detailed 
 to guarantee the delivery of a stable percept. However\, nobody seems to h
 ave a clear idea as to what\, exactly\, a perceptual inference is supposed
  to be.\n\nIn this paper\, I explore what it might mean for a perceptual s
 ystem\, rather than a conscious agent\, to perform an inference. I take th
 e example of the 'missing fundamental'\, often cited as an key example of 
 auditory illusion\, and I argue that we do not need to appeal to perceptua
 l inference in order to explain it. I claim that the 'missing fundamental'
  is not\, in fact\, a perceptual illusion\, nor does it count\nas a case w
 here the stimulus is critically impoverished. The motivations for appealin
 g to perceptual inference are thus undermined.\nMoreover\, I argue that\, 
 given the opacity of what is meant by 'perceptual inference'\, we should a
 void appealing to it\, in the presence of a simpler explanation. I close b
 y anticipating some objections\, and offering replies.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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