BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk// X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:The Game Theory of Conflict - Dr Thomas C Schelling\, University o f Maryland DTSTART:20160304T173000Z DTEND:20160304T183000Z UID:TALK58862@talks.cam.ac.uk CONTACT:Janet Gibson DESCRIPTION:Abstract\n\n The Prisoners' Dilemma: An Unsympathetic Critique \n\nThe most popular\, most famous\, most mentioned exemplar in game theor y\, especially in the social sciences\, is the 'prisoners' dilemma' - actu ally a predicament rather than a dilemma. Two men - all we know is their g ender - charged with a joint violation of the law\, are held separately by the police. Each is told that:\nIf one confesses and the other does not\, the former will be given a reward of one unit and the latter will be fine d two units\;\nIf both confess\, each will be fined one unit\;\nIf neither confesses\, both will go clear.\nEach of the two gains suffered less by c onfessing\, but if they could reach a binding agreement they would clearly agree not to confess.\nAs originally presented in unpublished note by Alb ert Tucker and\, usually\, faithfully followed by game-theoretic analysts\ , this is all we know\, namely their gender.\nIt usually follows\, at leas t by implication\, that both confess\, contrary to their joint interest.\n I am going to argue that we cannot conclude that the two are likely to con fess. My argument will be simply\, namely\, that we don't know what they k now and cannot predict what they will decide.\n\nBiography\n\nThomas C. Sc helling\, PhD Harvard economics\, 1951\, was on the Faculty of Yale Univer sity 1953-57\, spent 1958-59 at the RAND Corporation\, 1959-90 at Harvard\ , Department of Economics\, Centre for International Affairs\, and John F. Kennedy School of Government\, and 1990-2005 at the University of Marylan d's Department of Economics and School of Public Policy.\nHe was a fiscal analyst at the US Bureau of the Budget\, 1945-46\, did graduate work at Ha rvard\, 1946-48\, was in the Marshall Plan Mission to Denmark 1948-49\, th e European Office of the Marshall Plan\, Paris\, 1949-50\, the White House Foreign Policy Staff\, 1950-51\, and the Executive Office of the Presiden t (foreign aid programs)\, 1951-53.\nHis main theoretical interests have b een bargaining\, conflict and cooperation\, racial segregation and techniq ues of self-management. His main policy interests have been nuclear weapon s\, the limitation of war\, climate change\, foreign aid and tobacco. From 1983-1989 he was founding director of the Institute for the Study of Smok ing Behaviour and Policy at Harvard University.\nHis major books are The S trategy of Conflict\, 1960\, Strategy and Arms Control (with Morton H\, Ha lperin) 1961\, Arms and Influence 1966\, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour 1 978\, Choice and Consequence 1984\, and Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays 2006.\nHe has been elected to the National Academy of Sciences\, t he National Academy of Medicine\, and the American Academy of Arts and Sci ences\, and is the recipient of the Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award i n Political Economy and the National Academy of Sciences Award for Behavio ural Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War.\nIn 2005 he recei ved\, jointly with Robert Aumann\, the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sc iences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.\nThomas Schelling lives with his wife\, Alice Coleman Schelling\, in Bethesda Maryland. LOCATION:LMH\, Lady Mitchell Hall END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR