BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:'Bischer Nicht Gemeldet’: British Attempts to Assess German Manp
 ower Reserves during the Great War.'  - Louis Halewood\, University of Oxf
 ord
DTSTART:20160212T160000Z
DTEND:20160212T180000Z
UID:TALK64469@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Kate Bruce-Lockhart
DESCRIPTION:Revisionist historians have advanced our understanding of the 
 strategy of attrition which lay at the heart of the Great War\, yet in the
  middle of the centenary studies of the intelligence behind and assessment
  of attrition are few. In this paper\, I explore British attempts to asses
 s German manpower reserves\, and the implications this had for the making 
 of strategy. Understanding the size of the manpower resources of the enemy
 \, and the casualties already inflicted\, was crucial to determining what 
 the Entente needed to do to win the war\, or whether it even could be won.
  However\, this proved an enormous challenge.\nBritish sources were limite
 d and unreliable. Closed sources\, namely prisoners of war\, provided only
  a narrow – and potentially anomalous – snapshot of the broader pictur
 e. Open sources\, including casualty lists published by Germany\, were out
 dated or at worst potentially misinformation.\n\nWhile it was easier for s
 ome\, especially senior army officers\, to ignore this problem and rely on
  wishful estimates\, as the war dragged on it became clear that the questi
 on of German manpower demanded a serious answer. Consequently\, the Enemy 
 Personnel Committee (EPC) was established in London in 1916 to tackle the 
 problem. The EPC combined the expertise of soldiers and civil servants\, a
 nd deployed cutting-edge technology in the form of the Powers tabulating m
 achine. Yet none of this could negate the chief problem: a lack of quality
  sources. Ultimately\, the EPC provided reports shrouded in doubt\, which 
 were of little use to British leaders. Into this vacuum stepped Field Mars
 hal Sir Douglas Haig. His own headquarters’ dubious estimates were put f
 orward with confidence in Whitehall\, and without any real alternative Pri
 me Minister David Lloyd George listened\, and launched the Passchendaele o
 ffensive in 1917. Confidence had supplanted facts\; this was not a rationa
 l way to formulate strategy.\n
LOCATION:Seminar Room 3\, Alison Richards Building
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR