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SUMMARY:POLIS Department Seminar: Patronage Explanations for the Survival 
 of International Organizations - Julia Gray\, LSE
DTSTART:20160512T140000Z
DTEND:20160512T160000Z
UID:TALK66193@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:44146
DESCRIPTION:This paper argues that even ineffective international organiza
 tions can serve valuable patronage functions for their member states. Even
  if IOs fail in their goals\, the bureaucracies surrounding them can still
  be used for patronage\, defined here as the use of public office for poli
 tical and personal gain. The bureaucracies surrounding international organ
 izations can offer substantial private rents for member state governments.
  The perqs that an IO can offer can lead to ineffective organizations hang
 ing on\, even if they do not fulfill their original mandate. Patronage can
  thus be an unintended consequence of IOs\, leading to a misuse of the str
 ucture of IOs for corrupt purposes. This goes beyond the study of bureaucr
 atic drift to present a more pathological version of IOs. I illustrate thi
 s argument using two sets of empirical tests. The first establishes the br
 oad logic of patronage as a driver of IO survival\, and the second demonst
 rates the microfoundations. For the first\, I use an original datset of in
 ternational economic organizations around the world to show that the survi
 val of ineffective IOs is particularly likely when member states are corru
 pt. Patronage inclinations in member states makes ineffective organization
 s 15 percent more likely to survive. This demonstrates the broader pattern
  of the relationship between IO survival and patronage\; I then go on to i
 llustrate the patronage mechanism through examining finer-grained data fro
 m a subset of IOs. Using budget data gathered firsthand from 11 internatio
 nal economic organizations across the world\, I show that member states wh
 ere corruption is high tend to be associated with IOs where patronage prac
 tices persist. Through these budget data\, I develop original measures of 
 patronage in IOs: slush funding in organizations and the nonwage benefits 
 awarded to staff\, differentiated from such benefits received by member st
 ates. These novel measures offer unique insight into the ways in which IOs
  can be used for private gain. \n\n\nJulia Gray is an assistant professor 
 of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
  Science\, with a focus on international political economy. She received a
  PhD in political science from the University of California\, Los Angeles\
 ; an MSc with distinction in International Political Economy from the Lond
 on School of Economics\; and a BA summa cum laude from Amherst College. He
 r research centers on international economic relations and economic organi
 zations in emerging markets. Specifically\, she focuses on international o
 rganizations and reputations\, and on how and whether states and bureacrac
 ies in international agreements implement their mandates. Her book The Com
 pany States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor Percep
 tions in Emerging Markets was published in 2013 by Cambridge University Pr
 ess and was awarded the 2013 Lepgold Book Prize for the best book publishe
 d in international relations. In 2013-2014\, she was a visiting scholar at
  the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton Universi
 ty. She is currently working on a second book manuscript on implementation
  and adaptation in international economic organizations over time.
LOCATION: Room 119\, Alison Richard Building\, 7 West Road\, Cambridge\, C
 B3 9DT
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