BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk// X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:The Anti-Inference Bias and Circumstantial Evidence - Eyal Zamir ( Hebrew University of Jerusalem) DTSTART:20160927T151500Z DTEND:20160927T160000Z UID:TALK67612@talks.cam.ac.uk CONTACT:INI IT DESCRIPTION:My presentation will be based on two studies: Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias\, co-authored with Ilana Ritov a nd Doron Teichman (see here)\, and New Ev idence about Circumstantial Evidence\, co-authored with Elisha Harlev and Ilana Ritov (see here).

Ju dicial fact-finders are commonly instructed to determine the reliability a nd weight of any evidence\, be it direct or circumstantial\, without preju dice to the latter. Nonetheless\, studies have shown that people are reluc tant to impose liability based on circumstantial evidence alone\, even whe n this evidence is more reliable than direct evidence. Proposed explanatio ns for this reluctance have focused on factors such as the statistical nat ure of some circumstantial evidence\, the tendency of fact-finders to assi gn low subjective probabilities to circumstantial evidence\, and the fact that direct evidence can rule out with greater ease any competing factual theory regarding liability.

In the first article\, we demonstrated experimentally that even when these factors are controlled for\, the disin clination to impose liability based on non-direct evidence remains. For in stance\, people are much more willing to convict a driver of a speeding vi olation on the basis of a speed camera than on the basis of two cameras do cumenting the exact time a car passes by them &mdash\; from which the driv er&rsquo\;s speed in the pertinent section of the road is inferred. While these findings do not necessarily refute the previous theories\, they indi cate that they are incomplete. The new findings point to the existence of a deep-seated bias against basing liability on inferences &mdash\; an anti -inference bias.  \;

The second article describe seven new experiments that explore the scope and resilience of the anti-inference bi as. It shows that this bias is significantly reduced when legal decision-m akers confer benefits\, rather than impose liability. We thus point to a n ew legal implication of the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion. In contrast\, we find no support for the hypothesis that the reluctance to im pose legal liability on the basis of circumstantial evidence correlates wi th the severity of the legal sanctions. Finally\, the article demonstrates the robustness of the anti-inference bias and its resilience to simple de biasing techniques.

Taken together\, the studies show that the anti -inference bias reflects primarily normative intuitions\, rather than mere ly epistemological ones\, and that it reflects conscious intuitions\, rath er than wholly unconscious ones. The articles discuss the policy implicati ons of the new findings for procedural and substantive legal norms\, inclu ding the limited potential (and questionable desirability) of debiasing te chniques\, the role of legal presumptions\, and the advantages of redefini ng offenses in a way that obviates the need for inferences.

LOCATION:Seminar Room 1\, Newton Institute END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR