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SUMMARY:Newton's laws and epistemic amplification - Kirsten Walsh (Univers
 ity of Nottingham)
DTSTART:20161123T130000Z
DTEND:20161123T143000Z
UID:TALK68139@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:31287
DESCRIPTION:Newton claimed his laws of motion are certainly true\, and yet
  his justification was surprisingly weak: he merely cited a handful of exp
 eriments and the 'agreement of mathematicians'.  Surely then these \nlaws 
 are probable at best. I examine the experimental evidence Newton provided 
 and argue that\, while this evidence gives strong support for the laws in 
 limited cases\, and justifies their use in Newton's \nmathematical system\
 , it does not justify such strong epistemic claims. In modern Bayesian ter
 ms\, we might say that Newton's laws merit high subjective priors.  This d
 oes not make them certain. I then suggest \nthat Newton's laws earn episte
 mic warrant in another way: via a process I call 'epistemic amplification'
 .  On this account\, Newton's laws\, as the axioms of the theory\, gain ep
 istemic status by virtue of the \ntheory's success.  In some places\, this
  looks like straightforward confirmation: since the motions of the planets
  confirm Newton's theory\, they must also confirm the laws. But in other c
 ases\, Newton's \nmathematical model seems to provide a crucial test of th
 e laws. I sketch an account of this notion of epistemic gain. I then draw 
 some conclusions about Newton's methodology.  While my account offers some
  \nvindication for Newton's grand epistemic claims (not so far as 'certain
 ty'\, however)\, it contradicts his own methodological statements. In shor
 t\, the case highlights a key difference between Newton's method \nof 'ded
 uction from phenomena' and the popular hypothetico-deductive method.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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